This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.

The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need.

This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action.

All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.

Many people discuss the influence of groups, but few really understand why some groups have are more effective than others. Mancur Olson crafted subtle and persuasive arguments explaining why special interest groups are often so effective. People participate in groups according to the expected marginal costs and benefits. Problems with group action emerge when we consider externalities and public goods provision within groups.

Olson's theory is applied to labor unions, corporations, and other pressure groups. Olson also has a critique of Marxian class theory which drives one more nail into the coffin of communism. The Logic of Collective Action is important because it explains so much about how real groups have functioned throughout history. Pressure groups date back to the ancient world, and Olson's theory fits very well with this experience.

Olson's ideas need further dissemination because most people get the special interest issue wrong. Most people recognize that pressure groups are often pernicious. But all too many people think that undue special interest influence is just a current phase that can be dealt with in a simple manner. This book indicates that we really should reconsider the role of government in society, especially at the Federal level. Olson is certainly not an anarchist, he insists that there are some things that government can and should do. However, the inevitability of special interest influence does make it impossible for government to function as many would like it too. Read this book along with Gordon Tullock's The Politics of Bureaucracy. Olson and Tullock enable us to make greater sense of world history.

I initially read Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action over 30 years ago, and have found it to be a seminal work of economic scholarship that resonates over the decades. This masterpiece is in urgent need of new attention, especially as America confronts its role in a post September 11 society.

Olson's theory is deceptively simple: goods that are primarily public (everything from a town park to a cruise missile) suffer from a "free rider" problem, in that most of those who would benefit from their provision are not personally motivated to pay for them. Thus, collective action, undertaken through the political sphere, is needed to provide goods and services intended for the collective welfare.

"The Logic of Collective Action" is based on economic theory. Olson's theory recognizes that competitive markets are the best source of private goods, but draws an articulate and compelling case for the intervention of government to provide those goods and services that are beneficial for society, but which cannot be offered effectively through market mechanisms.

A re-reading of this concise and well-written volume is urgently needed in 2007 America. For close to three decades, the downsizing of government has been the dominant theme in U.S. political life. Some of this trimming may well have been appropriate, but events of recent years (September 11, the Katrina hurricane, the possibility of adverse climate change) suggest that collective action is needed to address the most pressing problems of our time.

Olson's gem of a book is a worthwhile place to start our national reconsideration of the logic of collective action.

This is a fine new edition of a seminal work in modern economics and political theory. Olson, in this work, introduced the concept of collective action problems: that the costs imposed on individuals for actions beneficial to a group may be too great, and the rewards to them too small, to induce them to act on behalf of the group. The book is highly readable and extremely thought-provoking.

Although refuting Marx is hardly a challenge, the argument against Marx here deviates from the norm with a refreshing new perspective.

Just as psychology has gotten, of all places, its most practical insight from the FBI via John Douglas and Michael Stone, and just as physics gets its most fruitful insights from mathematics, politics appears to get its most fruitful insights from economics. That is the corollary of this book.

There is tacit reference to Arrow's theorem in this book. However, more significant is the insight about collective bargaining one gains here. In the area of labor law, understanding collective thinking can help predict outcomes and therefore aid legal judgment.

This book does a good job of describing the effects of financial incentives on the ability of large and small groups to organize to promote their interests. But it doesn't try to analyze the effects of non-financial incentives such as the desire for a reputation for altruism.
One of the most striking features of this book is the worldview that it criticizes. Apparently when the book was written, it was respectable to believe that special interest group politics improved democracy. This book seems to have been one of the original reasons for the shift of opinions away from that view. But from today's perspective, Olson seems a bit naive in his optimism that large governments and labor unions will serve the public interest in spite of the problems that the book describes of small interest groups with concentrated interests being more effective at lobbying than large groups with diluted interests.
His clear reasoning on his main points is still not as widely understood as it should be. But the other two books of his that I've read are better (The Rise and Decline of Nations, and Power and Prosperity).